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Abstract 
 
Corruption interferes with and distorts the political and implementation processes, 
often to the disadvantage of the already disadvantaged. Yet our understanding of the 
factors that might propel a political system from lower to higher levels of probity (or 
vice versa) remains speculative at best. This article examines the role of one category 
of actors often touted as an important agent of change: civil society organizations. 
Considerable theoretical and empirical work exists on the expected and observed 
benefits of civil society for democracy more generally. Few studies have 
systematically examined the relationship between the richness of associational life 
and the quality of governance in a country. Moreover, several parallel theoretical 
accounts exist regarding the mechanism through which civil society might enhance 
government performance but few studies examine the relative explanatory merit of 
these theoretical accounts. This study addresses both of these gaps. The results show 
that civil society does have some bearing on the extent to which corruption exists in a 
country, and that the primary mechanism seems to be that civil society engages in 
contestation and representation of public interests. Two other theoretical accounts – 
that associations build social capital and therefore reduce corruption, and that welfare 
services provided by civil society organizations are less susceptible to corruption – 
receive less robust support in these data. 
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Introduction 
 
Political science research has in recent years shown a growing appreciation for the 
informal institutions of politics, the norms and networks that guide the behavior of both 
political principals, agents and clients in the political system, and the primary role these 
institutions play in determining the outcomes of the political process. Research on Latin 
American politics in particular has increasingly begun to direct attention at these informal 
practices, at how the political process works in actuality, a focus which represents a 
departure from a previous focus primarily on the formal institutional arrangements such 
as parties, elections, presidentialism and policy formation (Munck 2004, O’Donnell 
2001). While informal institutions may in some instances be networks of mutual 
assistance, they are often times interactions that create and perpetuate dependency and 
exclusion, infusing the public sphere with unpredictability and arbitrariness.  
This article explores these more detrimental informal institutions, loosely grouped under 
the label political corruption, and seeks to contribute to our understanding of what factors 
may explain why some societies have been able to contain corruption better than others. 
Corruption undermines regulation, acts as a regressive tax on the poor, distorts bidding 
processes leading to suboptimal subcontracting and at times infrastructure that is faulty or 
simply not built, and represents a breakdown of the principles of rule of law, a lynchpin 
of political equality. Recognition of these consequences has led researchers to examine 
the institutions and channels that may enable society to hold politicians and public 
officials accountable (e.g. Mainwaring & Welna 2003; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz 2006). 
The analysis presented here considers whether civil society organizations offer promise in 
this regard.  
Civil society is often pointed to as a key player in a meta-system of checks and balances 
in a polity. The OECD, one of several international organizations that has in the last 
decade begun to direct increasing attention to the issue of corruption, maintains that 
“Civil society plays a key role in fighting corruption. Today, this statement is 
unchallenged: it has become a leitmotiv of anti-corruption discourses” (OECD 2003). 
Other weighty actors on the international arena share this conviction and see a strong civil 
society as a key to combating corruption. In a short summary of its development 
philosophy, the United Nations Development Programme takes the following position: 
“Public sector management is increasingly seen as more than just modernising state 
institutions, it is also about fostering dynamic partnerships with civil society and the 
private sector in order to improve the quality of service delivery, enhance social 
responsibilities and ensure the broad participation of citizens in decision-making.”1 To 
offer more concrete example of this stance, projects to strengthen civil society constitute 
the single largest segment of USAID aid directed at reducing corruption (on the order of 
$33 million USD in 2002).2  
These optimistic endorsements of civil society organizations echo normative theories that 
see civil society as a key to a well functioning democracy. These theories envision civil 
society as constituting the organizational circuitry via which representation and 
accountability operate in representative democracy. Following to a great extent the work 
                                                 
1 http://www.undp.org/governance/sl-par.htm 
2 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/anti-corruption/types.html 
of Jürgen Habermas (1996), several authors emphasize the democratic deficit in models 
of government that only assign citizens a voice within the bounds of electoral institutions. 
Civil society is construed as giving shape to the communicative space of the public 
sphere, within which policy ideas take form or can be deliberated, modified, and tested 
for public responses and reactions (Arato 2006).  
Quite contrary to civil society optimists, the considerable volume of research on civil 
society and its role in processes of democratic development gives cause for more 
tempered expectations of civil society as a democratic force. A number of historical 
analyses of powerfully instructive cases have recently emerged that not only cast doubt 
on the capacity of civil society to promote democratic change but document in great detail 
the contributions of civil society organizations to highly anti-democratic movements. 
Civil society organizations in Weimar Germany strongly contributed the rise of a highly 
oppressive regime; numerous local and federated organizations in the United States 
joined forces to oppose desegregation efforts in the mid-twentieth century; and a number 
of movements in Argentina have unambiguously anti-systemic aims and little concern for 
democratic principles or rule of law (Armony 2004).  
Moreover, even if the historical record showed that civil society organizations did 
predominantly seek to bring about more democratic societies, it is important to keep in 
mind that they by their very nature of being non-governmental organizations and 
therefore outside the political system, lack formal coercive and sanctioning power and 
rely instead on tactics such as framing and shaming to bring about change (Gordon & 
Berkovitch; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Risse 2001; Snow & Benford 1992). For this reason, 
some authors argue that civil society actors cannot hold public officials accountable to 
public law, and therefore have a limited capacity to affect the quality of government 
practices (Mainwaring 2003, 7). 
Though the bodies research on civil society and corruption are each considerable in their 
own right, few studies examine the relationship between the two, and even fewer stretch 
beyond the scope of a single case. This article uses country level data to investigate 
whether there is any support for the contention that the richness of civil society in a polity 
has bearing on the extent to which government practices adhere to the law of that 
particular land, as measured by the perceived prevalence of corruption in the country. The 
results indicate that a dense civil society may in fact reduce corruption, though only in 
countries in which political institutions are democratic. The analyses then consider 
whether the observed relationship can be attributed to two other theoretical accounts of 
link between civil society and democracy in a country: that civil society organizations 
reduce corruption because they provide welfare services, or because the serve to generate 
social capital. In comparing the relative importance of these three explanations, I seek to 
assess the different theorized mechanisms via which civil society is presumed to 
contribute to increasing the quality of government. Can the roles of civil society identified 
in previous research be at work contemporaneously or have these research traditions 
simply been observing the same phenomenon through different theoretical lenses?  
The first section of the paper reviews the theorized mechanisms by which civil society 
might affect government performance. Section two details the data and measures used. 
The third part of the paper presents the analyses, and the concluding section draws out the 
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theoretical and policy implications of this study and identifies important questions for 
future research. 
 
Contestation and representation: Vertical accountability and civil society as 
generator and disseminator of norms 
A considerable body of comparative research explores the correlates of corruption, in 
particular factors such as economic well-being (e.g. Lee 2007; Montinola & Jackman 
2002), integration in the global economy and community (Ades & de Tella 1999; 
Sandholz & Gray 2003), the design of the electoral system (refs), the extent of political 
competition (Montinola & Jackman 2002); the structure of the political system whether 
parliamentary or presidential, centralized or federal (Charron 2007), the size of state 
spending and extent of regulation of the business environment (Hopkin & Rodríguez-
Pose 2007), and the degree of freedom and pluralism in the media (Lindstedt and Naurin 
2006). With the exception of Lee’s (2007) study of the effects of the density and 
centrality of labor unions on government performance, comparative research on good 
governance has largely ignored the role of civil society. In contrast, case study research 
has explored civil society efforts to hold government officials accountable and increase 
legality in government practice, identifying strategies and conditions under which civil 
society groups succeed in pressuring for prosecution of misdeeds or institutional reform 
(Armony 2004; Eaton 2003; Taylor 2006; Véron et al 2006; several chapters in Peruzzotti 
& Smulovitz 2006). Furthermore, a wealth of studies on social capital and social 
movements examine the role of civil society in related issues such as protecting human 
rights and enhancing the vibrancy of the democratic process more generally.  
Taking stock of some of the extensive and elucidating studies of civil society, Edwards, 
Foley & Diani (2001) delineate three broad functions that civil society may perform in 
contributing to raising standards of living and the standard of democracy in a country, a 
delineation that provides a useful framework for the comparative analysis presented 
below. Briefly, civil society may engage in contestation and representation, articulating 
the preferences and needs of a group or a group’s view of the public interest; 
organizations may also perform a ‘public or quasi-public function’ in providing welfare 
related services; and finally, civil society may play a central role in socializing 
individuals into norms of reciprocity, tolerance, and the give and take of procedural 
democracy (Edwards, Foley & Diani 2001, 5). While considerable research exists on each 
of these functions, we know little of their relative importance in enhancing democracy. 
Does civil society primarily enhance democracy by contestation and representation, by 
providing citizens with the social resources needed to act the role of citizens, or by 
socializing a broader populous in norms of tolerance and collaboration?  
Beginning with the thesis that civil society acts as an arena for representation and 
contestation, Jürgen Habermas (1996), and several have followed his lead, has argued that 
civil society constitutes the “…organizational substratum of groups, associations, and 
movements required of the generalization of the experience of communication, as well as 
for its political influence” (Arato 2006, 310). Civil society provides the organizational 
structure within which ideas relating to collective concerns, needs, and values take shape 
and may (or may not) be perceived by those in positions of political power. The influence 
of civil society in this regard is quite diffuse and occurs when organizations succeed in 
 3
framing issues to influence public understandings and actions (Gordon & Berkovitch; 
Keck & Sikkink 1998; Snow & Benford 1992). New issues assume salience, or new 
perspectives may come to light in the broad communicative process that transpires within 
and among organizations. To the extent that public understandings do change and 
embrace a new norm or focus on a new issue, civil society organizations may modify the 
political logic of prioritizing one policy over another, or institutional reform versus not. 
Several conditions might enable, or alternatively limit the capacity of, civil society to 
perform this deliberating function. First, organizations that are publicly oriented are 
presumed to be more important in this process—organizations that seek to communicate 
to and persuade a broader public and “have the capacity to project their voice” (Warren 
2001, 164). Organizations whose primary aim is to solve a collective problem that only 
involves a delimited group or provide enjoyment for members are presumably less 
relevant (Fung 2003). Skocpol and Fiorina (1999) argue that organizations that cut across 
class lines are also crucial in this broad discursive process, as a broad membership has the 
opportunity to articulate their interests to elite members, who can then represent these 
interests, in the name of the organization, in the political decision-making arena.  
Perhaps more importantly, attributes of the political environment determine whether civil 
society groups might participate in increasing accountability and enriching 
communication between citizens and political power. If those in power are not concerned 
with reelection, they lack incentives to respond to and heed public pressure (Arato 2006). 
In contexts in which political competition is weak or absent, as in one party systems or 
systems in which electoral fraud is prevalent, we might therefore expect civil society to 
have rather limited opportunities to affect any aspect of the use and practice of public 
power. Even in such authoritarian settings, however, authorities on both the input and 
output sides of politics benefit from retaining a certain level of legitimacy in the eyes of a 
citizenry and may therefore be concerned about the publication of information that might 
have reputational effects.  
One important exception to the dearth of comparative studies on the relationship between 
civil society and government corruption explores some of these issues. Lee (2007) 
provides considerable evidence that class transecting organizations indeed serve to 
channel ideas that are amenable to the broader public interest into the decision-making 
arena. Confirming Skocpol and Fiorina’s contentions, Lee (2007) shows that not only the 
strength (in terms of membership) of labor unions in a country but above all their degree 
of centrality in society has a strong empirical relationship to several quality of 
government indicators in the 50 countries studied. Centrality refers to the extent to which 
union members also belong to a variety of other associations (cultural, religious, political 
organizations or sports groups). Though labor unions generally do not identify corruption 
as a central problem in advancing their members’ interests, Lee points out that they do 
demand the enforcement of rights, the meting out of benefits and the protection of 
entitlements, all of which require well-functioning political institutions. Labor unions in 
principle work for the interests of the subordinate classes and therefore support 
redistributive policies, and redistributive policies presuppose a state not colluding with 
big business and crippled by corruption (Lee 2007, 588-590). 
Lee’s study presents convincing evidence for the case that certain kinds of civil society 
organizations indeed may act as a countervailing force to state power and the political 
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elites that benefit from a particularistic state. Lee does not consider alternative 
explanations for the observed relationship between labor union centrality and corruption, 
however. The degree to which labor union members are also members of other 
organizations might to some extent capture the density of associational life more 
generally, and a rich associational life itself may affect the quality and legality of 
government performance. Moreover, he does not consider whether the apparent capacity 
of civil society, and in particular well-enmeshed labor unions, varies in democratic and 
non-democratic contexts. Questions therefore remain regarding the actual mechanism at 
work. 
Aside from Lee’s study, case study research on both corruption mitigation and other 
related issues offers considerable support for the idea that civil society organizations 
indeed can affect both prevailing norms in a society but also policies and the behavior of 
public officials and agents of the state. Examinations of the diffusion of human rights 
norms has, for example, documented the ability of civil society organizations to play such 
a role. Social movements and transnational and national human rights activists have in 
numerous contexts succeeded in framing issues in terms of human rights and thereby 
affected social practices (Burgerman 1998; Gordon and Nitza present a useful review; 
Keck & Sikkink 1998).  
Moreover, investigations of the efforts of specifically anti-corruption organizations have 
shown that the ability of civil society organizations to bring about change at least on a 
local scale is also not implausible. In countries as divergent as the Philippines and Russia, 
studies document successful efforts by NGOs in changing the attitudes and behavior of 
both citizens and frontline bureaucrats. In the Philippines, legal aid organizations educate 
citizens regarding their rights and entitlements and the procedures by which to demand 
that those rights and entitlements be honored by public officials (Golub 1998). In Russia, 
anti-corruption NGOs have worked instead directly with lower level state agencies 
(primarily the police) to raise awareness regarding human rights and the proper use of 
force in engagements with citizens. The Russian police, realizing citizens’ generally low 
opinion of law enforcement officials, in some cases themselves contact NGOs in order to 
obtain advice and guidance (Taylor 2006).  
 
Alternative mechanisms: the service provision and socializing functions 
of civil society 
That civil society creates an arena for contestation and an avenue channeling demands 
and norms into decision-making spaces is not the only conceivable means by which civil 
society affects the quality of government in a country. A rich associational culture may 
constrain corruption by at least two other means. First, associations may form (either via 
grassroots efforts or local interventions by national or transnational organizations) to 
address the social and economic welfare needs of communities, thereby  supplanting the 
state’s role in the provision of public services and infrastructure. In 26 of the 32 countries 
studied by the Center for Civil Society Studies at John’s Hopkins University, the largest 
share of civil society activity was primarily oriented toward service functions such as 
education, health and social services, (the remaining organizations were primarily 
involved in expressive fields: culture, professional and advocacy organizations.) In Peru, 
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as many as 95 percent of all civil society organizations direct their efforts to service 
provision (Salamon, Sokolowski, and List 2003, 23-26).  
The thesis that levels of corruption in a society may vary depending on the size of the 
non-profit welfare service sector rests on two assumptions. The first assumption is that 
civil society service providers would be less prone to venality than public providers. The 
assumption is to some extent plausible when it comes to locally formed organizations; the 
formation of a local organization reflects a capacity to solve a collective action dilemma 
and therefore signals a minimal level of trust among members of the community. It also 
reflects a shared awareness of mutual interdependence and a preoccupation with the long-
term well-being of the community as a whole. The same norms that enable a community 
to form such an organization in the first place, may deter both service providers and 
clients of a such an organization from bending rules to increase their own personal gains. 
If the service providing organizations are more locally based, then the chain of 
accountability between providers and beneficiaries is quite short, as service recipients 
belong to the same community as service providers. If on the other hand, service 
providers are funded by domestic or international donors, they belong to an accountability 
structure that may be more effective and stringent than governmental evaluations and 
audits. However, norms of collaboration are not inviolable and chains of accountability 
leading to international donors not infallible. A recent audit carried out by the Swedish 
National Audit Office of development projects funded by the Swedish International 
Development Agency found evidence of improprieties in almost all of 15 projects 
investigated.  
The second assumption implied by the service provision thesis is that a smaller public 
sector also limits the scope and extent of corruption, though most studies find that this is 
not the case (Hopkin & Rodríguez-Pose 2007; Montinola & Jackman 2002). An 
exploration of the scope of civil society service provision is nonetheless in order as it has 
received little empirical attention, and is a theoretically plausible explanation that is also 
analytically distinct from the size government. 
The third mechanism that might account for why a richer civil society reduces the level of 
corruption in a country comes from work on social capital and its importance for a well-
functioning democracy. A rich associational landscape, in which a large proportion of 
citizens engage in various activities and capacities, may have an indirect but nonetheless 
purportedly profound importance on democracy by capacitating citizens with skills, 
democracy-friendly norms and an enhanced understanding of the possibilities and 
benefits of collaborating with others to achieve common goals (Putnam 1993; 2000). 
Both social capital theory and theories of participatory democracy have advanced and 
elaborated claims that citizens’ participation in political but also non-political associations 
provides the necessary foundation for democracy in the formal political system to 
function properly (Pateman 1970).  
The mechanisms by which a rich associational life might contribute to mitigating 
corruption are similar to the link to democracy more generally. Participation in local 
organizations, whether those organizations relate to culture, sports, bird-watching or the 
provision of common goods, may strengthen norms relating to the efficient administration 
of pooled resources. In other words, participating directly in associational life may 
 6
provide an appreciation that such collective efforts are possible and thereby breed an 
intolerance of the misuse of positions of power and responsibility.  
More in line with the theory of social capital, direct involvement in managing small-scale 
projects involving pooled resources may help to dissolve the belief that others will with 
certainty take every opportunity to benefit personally from collective efforts. A rich 
associational life more generally may strengthen networks of reciprocity and mutual trust, 
which lowers the risk associated with initiating collective more generally. Social capital 
in a locality or region may thereby enable individuals to solve the social dilemma that 
breaking patterns of clientelism and corruption entails. Several studies partially or wholly 
substantiate this theorized mechanism. Wampler (forthcoming) finds that the richness of 
civil society in a municipality may be a key determinant of the success of participatory 
budgeting, which increases accountability and weakens clientelistic networks. Gay’s 
(1994) study of a neighborhood association in Rio de Janeiro favela also provides an 
example of how cooperation at the local level, facilitated by trust among the 
neighborhood’s residents, enabled a group of residents to break its dependence on patron 
networks in the city.  
It is, however, worth noting that the link between a vibrant civil society and lower 
corruption is certainly not as simple as the preceding discussion suggests. Local capacity 
to organize may equally well be used to extract maximum benefits in electoral clientelism 
as to break dependence on clientelistic relationships. Gay’s (1994) study mentioned above 
also detailed the experience of a different neighborhood association that chose exactly 
that tack, promising to all vote for the same candidate in exchange for paved roads and 
street lighting in the favela.  
Thus far, the term civil society has been used to capture a broad terrain of clubs, activist 
groups, neighborhood associations and much more. A few words of clarification is 
perhaps in order. The three different mechanisms are not merely different theoretical 
accounts, however, as they imply to some extent different types of organizations. Most 
obviously, the service provision thesis suggests that the size specifically of the civil 
society service sector matters for corruption and for this thesis it is irrelevant how 
numerous other kinds of associations are or how involved the general public is in these 
organizations. The contestation/representation thesis presumes that what might affect 
good government is the intensity of activity of publicly oriented organizations, as well as 
the extent to which these organizations have broad memberships bridging over class lines. 
Here the analyses will examine a proxy measure that captures the density of development 
related civil society organizations. Organizations that define their goals as development 
related are most certainly concerned with public issues, but it is far from certain that they 
engage actively in public debate. The third mechanism implies and even broader 
definition of civil society. Putnam’s own work (1993) argues that any and all associations 
generate reciprocity and democracy norms but subsequent discussions have argued 
convincingly that only certain types of associations may be expected to have such effects 
while others may actively breed animosity and distrust of the broader society.  
 
Conditions of CSO capacity and the issue of causality  
The three broad roles discernable in the existing literature – civil society as the arena for 
articulating and expressing a broader public interest, civil society as more honest provider 
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of services, and civil society as socializing citizens in democratic skills and norms and as 
an organizational structure for mobilization – are by no means mutually exclusive (Taylor 
2006, 198). Archon Fung (2003) has argued that the various roles may be more or less 
effective, and therefore more or less prevalent, depending on the institutional 
environment in the country at a given time. Authoritarian regimes might prompt citizens 
to take on an adversarial and perhaps antagonistic role, while civil society might to a 
greater extent deal with self-expression or solving local collective concerns in more 
consolidated democracies (Fung 2003, 534). A number of other studies have documented 
the causal role of government institutions in shaping the associational landscape.  
Taking these complexities into account has implications for this study in at least two 
ways. First, they introduce the issue of reverse causality, which will receive more 
thorough consideration below. Second, they point to the fact that the specifics of the 
political regime might not only affect the associational landscape, but also the means and 
opportunities available to, and also seemingly appropriate for, organizations that seek to 
influence policy and political practices. With respect to the mechanism relating to 
contestation and accountability, the extent to which the political system is responsive and 
transparent greatly affects the capacity of actors to spot misdeeds, hold government 
accountable, and transmit public demands in salient decision-making arenas. Even if 
organizations in non-democratic systems employed strategies and seek to give voice to a 
discourse articulating a broad public interest, these efforts would fall on fallow ground if 
a free and pluralistic media did not come to its aid, or a lack of political competition 
rendered the political leadership less susceptible to public opinion. The analyses 
presented here therefore consider not only whether and by what means civil society may 
contribute to curbing corruption, but in what kind of political system, defined here 
following Alvarez et al’s (1996) classification of countries as either a democracy or 
dictatorship.  
The nature of the political system also affects, as mentioned above, civil society in 
numerous ways, both in terms of the density, the strategies and aims, and the 
organizational structure of civil society groups. Associations in an increasingly federal 
United States tended to assume a federal structure (Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000); 
civil society organizations in highly oppressive regimes such as Weimar Germany or the 
Jim Crow laws in the United States actively supported and contributed to the oppression 
of minorities (Armony 2004); a more democratic regime will tolerate the emergence of a 
citizens’ groups (Paxton 2002); and a state characterized by rule of law will provide a 
framework that fosters interpersonal trust (Rothstein & Kumlin 2005) all of which might 
contribute strongly to the emergence of a strong civil society. In this spirit, Sidney Tarrow 
(1996) has advanced a reinterpretation of Robert Putnam’s (1993) findings, arguing 
instead that the varying levels of political development many centuries ago in Italy’s 
various regions, in combination with other historical events, account for variations in civil 
society today.  
With respect to the service provision thesis, corruption may also be a cause rather than a 
consequence. Poor quality public services may prompt people to select an exit strategy 
and instead collaborate with others to secure the provision of needed services. Evidence 
of such opting out has been documented by several authors regarding Latin America, 
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where the middle classes in particular have turned to this alternative (Jacobs & 
Moldonado 2005).  
In order to be able to discern if a relationship actually exists between civil society activity 
and propriety in government, and if so if there are any grounds for presuming that civil 
society in fact may contribute to government probity rather than being a response to the 
institutional landscape, the analyses seek to take into account any other factors that might 
explain levels of corruption, civil society activity, and especially those factors that might 
explain both. Two such explanations are particularly salient for investigation: economic 
development and democratic openness. 
Numerous studies now confirm that a factor consistently and strongly linked to levels of 
political corruption in a country is its level of economic development, most frequently 
measured as GDP per capita. Economists have long argued and sought to determine the 
direction of causality in this relationship, a debate which has generated ample evidence on 
their interdependence and few conclusive results regarding which comes first 
(Lambsdorff 2006). The simple explanation for the mixed empirical results is of course 
that reality defies such simple explanations. Neither economic growth nor the emergence 
of more impartial and predictable government institutions can occur entirely without the 
other. To make matters worse, some sorts of economic growth seem to impede the 
consolidation of political institutions and some forms of corruption may facilitate 
economic growth, a phenomenon observed in the newly industrializing economies of East 
Asia, (Rock and Bonnett 2004). 
In order to isolate the effect of civil society activity on corruption, the analysis ought 
therefore to sort out to what extent economic growth might account for both the strength 
of civil society activity as well as the level of corruption in a country. Since political 
institutions play a key role in economic growth, controlling for GDP per capita in effect 
means that one also controls for the quality of government institutions at earlier points in 
time. Corruption may have considerable implications for the business and investment 
environment, and the lag time between changes in corruption and economic growth may 
in some cases be relatively short. A sudden increase in large scale corruption in for 
example procurement or bidding for contracts may force foreign investors to rethink 
investments in a country, or the use of political power to reward regime friendly firms and 
punish others (observed in contemporary Russia, Economist 2008) may force domestic 
entrepreneurs into bankruptcy. To the extent that an increase in corruption has relatively 
short term consequences for the economy, controlling for GDP per capita on corruption 
assessments from the same year as corruption measures may in theory therefore mean 
controlling for levels of corruption in a fairly recent historical past.  
There is no simple means of including this relevant explanatory variable while entirely 
avoiding building in a tautology in the model. In an effort to minimize the problem, the 
analyses control for GDP per capita at an earlier point in time (1995). This measure 
captures the significance of economic development for quality of government on a more 
historical scale without making the model overly redundant.  
The degree of basic freedoms and political competition in a country, in short the degree of 
democratic liberalization, is a second factor that may account for lower levels of 
corruption and may also explain the richness of civil society (Montinola and Jackman 
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2002; Lindstedt & Naurin 2006). The models therefore also control for levels of press 
freedom and the number of years a country has been a democracy which Gerring & 
Thacker (2004), as well as Treisman (2000) find to be a more powerful predictor of 
corruption than current levels of democracy. Other factors, such as the design of the 
electoral system and the structure of the political system are not included in the analyses 
as they presumably have little bearing on civil society activity. 
The analyses also take into account certain social development indicators which, along 
with GDP per capita, allows us to some extent rule out reverse causality. A state that 
crates an environment conducive to economic growth and that provides citizens with the 
social resources of health and education, also creates an environment amenable to a 
vibrant civil society. Including literacy rates in the model to some extent takes this 
possibility into account. 
 
Data and Measurement 
The study uses three different sources of data to capture civil society activity: a directory 
of development related organizations compiled by CIVICUS (a global network of civil 
society organizations), a study conducted at the Johns Hopkins University Center for 
Civil Society Studies, and the World Values Survey. Each of these three has advantages 
and drawbacks and provides a different measure of civil society. The first simply lists 
organizations per country, the second assesses the proportion of the active work force that 
is involved in various sorts of organizations, and the third builds on individual level 
surveys of membership and degree of involvement. While the World Values survey is 
quite well known, a brief word on the other two data sources is in order. 
The Johns Hopkins study builds on data gathered from four sources of data: 1) “official 
economic statistics (e.g., employment surveys, population surveys), particularly those that 
included coverage of civil society organizations, giving, or volunteering. … [2] Data 
assembled by umbrella groups or intermediary associations representing various types of 
civil society organizations, or industries in which civil society organizations are active; 
[3] Specialized surveys of civil society organizations; and [4] Population surveys, 
focusing particularly on giving and volunteering” (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003, 
11). These data provide a detailed portrait of the activities, sources of funding, reliance on 
paid and volunteer staff, and several other aspects of organizational life in each country.  
While the methodology of the Johns Hopkins study inspires confidence regarding the 
reliability of data, the number of countries included (up to 35, fewer for some aspects of 
the analysis) precludes extensive comparative analyses among countries. The countries 
included cover a range of regions and historical trajectories, and in order to investigate 
patterns associated with the size and political consequences of civil society, these factors 
must be taken into account. The analyses therefore also build on data gleaned from the 
CIVICUS directory. While the Johns Hopkins study and the World Values Survey 
employ fairly well established social science methods, the CIVICUS directory is 
compiled for the development community and does not purport to be an exhaustive 
register of all organizations. Organizations may themselves ask to be included but 
otherwise are identified primarily through public sources on the internet. A comparison of 
the 35 countries for which the Johns Hopkins study has collected data presents one means 
of validating the directory data. Though the two provide different means of measuring 
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civil society (the directory a simple count, adjusted for population size, of development 
organizations, the Johns Hopkins study a measure of the proportion a country’s workforce 
active in civil society), the two measures correlate respectably (Pearson’s r=0.63, 
p<0.001). The discrepancy between the two may reflect inaccuracies in the directory data 
but may also stem from the fact that the directory encompasses only development related 
organizations while the Johns Hopkins study surveyed all civil society organizations. 
The analyses build on the World Bank’s measure of corruption defined as the exercise of 
public power for private gain. The measure builds on the perceptions of experts and key 
sources and spans from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values representing lower corruption. With 
the exception of the measures of civil society, this and all the measures used in this 
analysis are included in the publicly available database compiled by the Quality of 
Government Institute (www.qog.pol.gu.se), Gothenburg University. 
The analyses also control for whether a country is a democracy or authoritarian regime 
using the categories defined by Alvarez and colleagues (1996). The categorization is also 
used to investigate whether the relationship between the density of civil society and levels 
of corruption differs in democracies and dictatorships. The classification of regimes 
builds on three elements relating to the degree of political competition in a country: 1) 
whether the executive is directly or indirectly elected, 2) whether the legislative assembly 
is directly elected, and 3) whether more than one party exists and has a reasonable chance 
of winning elections (Alvarez et al 1996, 7-10). Based on these rules, 84 countries are 
classified as democracies and 72 as authoritarian regimes.3 The classification corresponds 
with the Freedom House groupings into free, partially free and not free countries, with all 
84 ‘democratic’ countries in the Alvarez classification being categorized as ‘free’ by 
Freedom House. 
Finally, the analyses also take into consideration the following factors: Ethnic 
fractionalization as measured by the “probability that two randomly selected people from 
a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The higher the number, 
the more fractionalized society” (Teorell, Holmberg & Rothstein 2008, 57; see Alesina et 
al 2003 for a more detailed explanation); the Freedom House measure of free press, 
which takes into account legal restrictions on the media, as well as political pressures and 
controls that may distort press freedom (the scale ranges from 0 ‘least free’ to 100 ‘most 
free’); the number of years a country has been a democracy between 1930 and 2000 
(Treisman 2007); and an estimate of the percentage of the adult population that are 
literate (Vanhanen 2003). 
 
Results 
Although the three questions speak to each other, the analysis of each has distinct data 
requirements and will therefore be addressed one at a time. The first question, to reiterate, 
was whether the richness of associational life has any bearing on the quality of 
government in a country and whether the relationship differs between democracies and 
dictatorships. The analyses presented below suggest that a richer associational life does 
enhance quality of government, though to varying degrees given the institutional 
arrangements in the country and also perhaps via different mechanisms simultaneously. 
                                                 
3 In Latin America, Cuba, Ecuador and Paraguay are considered non-democratic.  
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Furthermore, the intensity of civil society activity seems to matter not only in more 
industrialized democracies but also in countries with less well established democratic 
institutions.  
The first theorized mechanism linking civil society activity to the quality of governing 
processes related to the capacity of civil society to represent the public in a direct sense 
either by contributing to the emergence of a discourse favorable to the public interest, or 
by exerting pressure to hold public officials accountable for deeds, practices or 
(non)decisions. If this mechanism is at work, the strength of civil society should 
presumably have a stronger bearing on the incidence of corruption in countries with 
political institutions that are more receptive to public discourse and sensitive to public 
opinion.  
Looking first at all countries regardless of the nature of the political system, the number 
of development civil society organizations in a country does correspond with the level of 
corruption in the country, independent of factors such as economic development, freedom 
of the press and ethnic diversity (Table 1, model 1). The effect is, however, not 
substantively strong and marginally statistically significant (p=0.06). As mentioned 
above, if civil society acts in the capacity theorized above, the strength of civil society 
should matter more in democratic countries. The second model in table 1 suggests that 
this indeed is the case.  
Figure 1 and 2 here 
In democracies, the density of development civil society organizations in the country has 
a considerably stronger and more certain relationship with government corruption. As 
figures 1 and 2 show, the relationship is not linear but can be made more so by taking the 
natural log (ln) of the number of civil society organizations per capita. While taking the 
natural log of the key independent variable allows for a more accurate model, it also 
makes interpreting the coefficient more difficult. Concretely, then, the difference in the 
average level of corruption in countries with sparse civil societies (the 5th percentile, 
approximately 0.3 organizations per million inhabitants) and countries in which civil 
society organizations are comparatively quite dense (the 95th percentile, circa 47 
organizations per million inhabitants) is roughly 0.6 on the -2.5 to 2.5 corruption scale.4 
The fact that the curve is log-linear rather than linear indicates, however, that an increase 
from very low to moderate density of civil society is associated with a more substantial 
reduction in corruption than an increase from moderate density to high density.  
Table 1 here 
An examination of the standardized coefficients reveals that, in line with the findings of 
most other studies, the level of economic development in the country proves to have the 
strongest relationship with corruption estimates, followed by freedom of the press and 
measures of democracy. The density of civil society emerges as almost as important as 
the more general measures of democracy, however, and more important than factors 
pointed to by earlier studies such as ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al 2003) and the 
number of years a country has been a democracy (Treisman 2007).  
                                                 
4 The difference in corruption in countries with sparse versus dense civil societies (=0.559) was computed 
as follows: ln47(0.11)-ln0.3 (0.11), where 0.11 is the estimate for the effect of civil society in democratic 
countries. 
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The fact that the density of civil society is linked to higher levels of probity only in 
democracies seems to lend support for the argument that civil society can serve to 
generate a discourse on norms related to a specific aspect of public interest, in this case 
anti-corruption. Development CSOs, like unions, represent the interests of the lower 
classes and may pressure public officials to provide goods and services, or enable 
neighborhoods and communities to organize and break dependence on local patrons. 
These organizations may also provide a structure within which information and norms 
that are relevant to anti-corruption work may dissipate, both downwards to citizens but 
also upwards to civil society organizations that are more well-connected with political 
decision makers. In non-democratic countries, however, the density of civil society has no 
relation at all with levels of corruption.  
Before turning to the next set of analyses, it is necessary to address a question regarding 
the geographic scope of the findings presented here. The source of data on civil society 
density is, to reiterate, a directory of development (broadly defined) related organizations. 
In more affluent societies, many of those organizations have as their primary focus not 
the needs, wants and desires of the citizens of their own country but instead to contribute 
to social and economic development in other parts of the world. To assess whether it is 
north-to-south development organizations predominantly in OECD countries that drive 
the results, the model was run including only non-OECD countries, plus Mexico and 
Turkey. Though somewhat substantively smaller (b=0.09, p=0.07), the analysis reveals a 
relationship between civil society activity and corruption in non-OECD countries as well. 
The difference between countries with sparse and dense civil societies (5th compared to 
95th percentile cases) is in this subset of countries still 0.45 on the -2.5 to 2.5 corruption 
scale. 
Turning to the second question of whether increased service provision by CSOs 
correspond to lower corruption, the analysis produces only weak support for this thesis. 
This analysis seeks to determine whether the effects observed in the previous section 
might be the result of the service provision mechanism. Precluding this explanation will 
further strengthen the interpretation that the above effects are the result of representation, 
contestation and accountability as argued.  
Data compiled by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies provides 
a more fine-grained but also more reliable portrait of civil society in a sample of 35 
countries, allowing for an examination of whether the service provision mechanism seems 
to be at work. The Johns Hopkins study evaluated not only the number of associations but 
also statistics such as the number of individuals active as volunteers and paid employees, 
sources of funding and the primary field of activity of each organization (Salamon, 
Sokolowski and List 2003). For the countries included in their study, it is therefore 
possible to assess the relationship between corruption in a country and the size of the civil 
society sector providing services compared to CSOs with other fields of activity. Those 
other fields of activities predominantly relate to functions that the authors label 
expressive: advocacy, the environment, culture and professional organizations. In the 
total sample, four percent of the civil society sector deal with neither of these (1% 
foundations, 1% international and 2% other). Does, then, the provision of a larger share of 
welfare services by civil society organizations coincide with lower levels of corruption in 
the country? As table two reveals: yes, but not independent of other factors.  
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Table 2 here 
The models presented in table 2 suggest that the relative size of the service providing 
non-governmental sector has little bearing on the level or corruption in the country. As 
the relatively strong bivariate correlation coefficient indicates, the two factors do overlap 
with one another. To give a sense of the association between corruption and service 
CSOs, countries with comparatively sparse civil society activity (lowest 5th percentile) 
rank on average 2.2 steps lower on the -2.5 to 2.5 scale than countries with dense civil 
societies in the service sector (the 95th %-ile). The corresponding figure for non-service 
CSOs is 3 steps.  
The empirical overlap seems, in the case of service CSOs, to reflect the fact that both 
factors are associated with economic well-being and the level of democratic openness in 
the country. When GDP per capita and freedom of the press are entered into the model (a 
somewhat pared down model due to the limited number of observations), the extent of 
civil society service provision does not retain a relationship with the level of corruption in 
a country. The strength of expressive civil society organizations does, on the whole, 
however, seem to reduce levels of corruption, confirming the results reported in table 1. 
Controlling for other factors such as government spending on health as percentage of 
GDP, the number of years a country has been a democracy since 1930, the level of 
democracy in the country, the extent of ethnic fractionalization does not substantially 
affect any of the coefficients or significance levels reported in table 2. Countries in which 
a larger share of the workforce is active in civil society associations tend to have lower 
levels of corruption, and this relationship does not seem to stem from the fact that richer, 
more well established democracies do better on both accounts. 
The preceding analyses have shown that the density of associations in a society matters 
for corruption, and that the mechanism does not seem to be service provision. The 
question remains however, of whether the observed relationship between civil society and 
corruption might not be via the mechanism of socialization rather than via the mechanism 
of representation and contestation as suggested. Contemporary followers of de 
Tocqueville maintain that involvement in associations instills norms and develops skills 
necessary in a democratic society.  
The analyses presented in table 3 indicate that while the level of social (interpersonal) 
trust in a country, a central component of social capital, does correspond to levels of 
corruption, it does not seem to account for the link between the number of development 
organizations and corruption. The first analysis presented in Table 3 replicates the 
analyses presented for question one but including only those countries for which World 
Values Survey is available, and including only the variables that proved most relevant in 
explaining corruption, GDP and free press. In those 60 countries, CSO density still relates 
to corruption, although the effect appears less substantial than in the preceding analyses. 
Introducing two possible intervening variables, social trust and support for democracy as 
a system of governance, has no bearing on this relationship. It remains completely 
unchanged. Interestingly, social trust has an independent and approximately equally 
strong relationship as that of CSO density (β=0.13 compared to that of CSO density, 
β=0.10). In other words, while citizens’ norms of reciprocity may matter for corruption, 
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they do not seem to interfere strongly with the explanatory power of the number of 
development CSOs in the country.5 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Large-N comparative analyses that encompass all or nearly all countries of the world, by 
their very nature paint social and political reality in very broad brush strokes, ignoring 
complexities, intricacies, and reducing enormous variation into single measures. Civil 
society in Jordan is certainly not a close cousin of civil society in Sweden, nor of that in 
Costa Rica. Any patterns found in such sweeping comparisons must of course be fleshed 
out with more in-depth studies to verify, and more importantly add detail to, the patterns 
detected in analyses such as these. That said, sweeping comparisons have the advantage 
of detecting precisely that: patterns.  
The analyses presented here suggest that a pattern does exist between the strength of civil 
society and the level of government corruption in a country, though only in polities with 
democratic regimes. According to two different measures of the richness of civil society – 
first as the number of development related CSOs relative to population size, and second 
as the proportion of the work force involved in CSOs – democracies with richer 
associational landscapes tend to demonstrate lower levels of corruption, other relevant 
factors such as average wealth, level of democracy and the freedom of the press being 
equal.  
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the potential of civil society to affect government 
performance lies in its capacity to channel a discourse, either from the grassroots level or 
from the global arena, into the public sphere, ultimately shaping the ideas regarding 
needed reforms and appropriate behavior. Several points of the analysis support this 
conclusion. First, the fact that strength of civil society only mattered in democratic 
countries suggests that the responsiveness of the political system, as well as the extent of 
discursive space available to the actors in the system, affect the capacity of civil society to 
mitigate corruption. This finding is more difficult to interpret using other theoretical 
accounts of the role of civil society in enhancing the quality of government. In addition, 
the alternative theoretical accounts (that civil society presents a less corrupt alternative for 
welfare services, or that civil society socializes citizens in the fundaments of collaborative 
efforts) receive less convincing support in this study, and do not even slightly detract 
from the observed relationship between the density of civil society organizations and 
corruption. The evidence is admittedly circumstantial but, again, the investigations 
presented here demonstrate that a fairly robust pattern exists. 
If one were to formulate policy recommendations based on these findings, it might in 
support of anti-corruption aid that channels money into civil society activity, provided 
that the country in question is democratic. Support for civil society organizations in non-
democratic may not have the same beneficial effects for good governance, however. The 
rather modest, albeit robust, relationship between the density of civil society and 
                                                 
5 The number of organizations that people belong to (also measured in the World Values Survey) also has 
an effect on corruption that is independent of CSO density. Unfortunately, that question was asked in fewer 
countries, and once free press is controlled for, neither CSO density nor the number of organizations people 
belong to have a relationship with corruption.  
 15
corruption suggests, however, that investments in civil society might not give 
overwhelming returns in the form of better government practices.  
That said, it is important again to remind ourselves that the measure of civil society used 
here perhaps may not capture the full effect of civil society activity. Numerous 
organizations have emerged in many countries around the world whose main aim and 
objective is to work to combat corruption. More penetrating studies of the organizational 
strategies but also contextual factors that determine the success of these organizations are 
needed.  
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Table 1. The effect of CSOs on levels of corruption. 
Model 1 B (β)  Model 2, with 
interaction term 
B (β) 
Constant  0.12   0 
CSOs per million 
inhabitants (ln) 
 0.05 (0.06) p=0.13  In democracies 0.11 (0.16)*** 
   In non-democracies -0.01 (0) 
Non-democracy  0.30 (0.15)***   0.54 (0.27) 
Free press -0.01 (-0.35)***   0.02 (0.36)*** 
Yrs of democracy since 
1930 
0 (0.05)   0 (0.04) 
GDP per cap 1995 0 (0.7)***   0 (0.7)*** 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.33 (-0.09)   -0.32 (-0.08)** 
% Literates 0 (-0.10)**   0 (-0.10) 
N 145   145 
R2adj 0.82   0.82 
Standardized coefficients in parentheses.  
* p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2. The effect of the size of the CSO service sector on levels of corruption 
 Bivariate models 
B (β) 
Multivariate model  
B (β) 
Constant   
% workforce in service CSOs 0.23 (0.59)*** 0.03 (0.08) 
% workforce in other CSOs 0.63 (0.78)*** 0.17 (0.21)** 
Free press  0.03 (0.40)*** 
GDP per cap 1995  0 (0.40)*** 
% Literates  n.s. 
   
N 30 29 
R2adj 0.32 and 0.56 0.90 
Standardized coefficients in parentheses. 
* p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 3. Exploring mechanisms of the effect of civil society density on corruption: social 
capital and norms of democracy  
 B (β) B (β) B (β) 
Constant 0.36 0.22 0.27 
Number of CSOs per million inhabitants 0.09 (0.10)** 0.09 (0.10)** 0.09 (0.10)** 
Interpersonal trust  0.96 (0.13)***  
Democratic norms   0.05 (0.05) 
GDP per cap 1995 0 (0.53) *** 0 (0.46) *** 0 (0.49)*** 
Free press 0.03 (0.45) *** 0.03 (0.45) *** 0.03 (0.45)*** 
    
N 60 60 60 
R2adj 0.90 0.91 0.90 
Standardized coefficients in parentheses. 
* p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Fig. 1. Density of CSOs and Control of Corruption-Democracies Fig. 2. Density of CSOs (ln) and Control of Corruption-Democracies 
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Fig. 3. The density of CSOs and Control of Corruption-Dictatorships 
 
 
Fig 4. The Density of CSOs (ln) and Control of Corruption-Dictatorships 
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